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In this paper we analyze how legitimacy allows us to develop differentiated relationships in 
business  networks.  Our  central  argument  is  that  the  building  of  legitimacy  in  business 
networks  through  certification  needs  the  development  of  what  we  call  differentiated 
relationships,  based  on  the  use  of  governance  mechanisms.  Mainly  theoretical,  our 
communication  develops  the  argument  through  a  critical  review  of  literature.  We  use  the 
organizational legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994) and institutional theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) approach to explain how business networks can adopt  and manage legitimacy. We 
exploit also the economic theory (Brousseau and Raynaud, 2006) and social theory of agency 
(Westphal  and  Zajac,  1998)  to  explain  the  adoption  of  specific  governance  mechanisms 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007) that legitimate business networks.  
We apply our question to a specific third party certification market: the fair trade market. 
We show that to build legitimacy in business networks it is necessary to use and manage 
governance  mechanisms  in  the  best  way.  These  actions  lead  to  establish  differentiated 











Business markets have seen an increased importance of different kinds of value that are 
nowadays  necessary  to  legitimate  the  offer  (i.  e.  values  concerning  ethics,  environment, 
safety,  social  concerns  etc.).  The  main  consequence  for  business  practice  is  a  rapid 
development of third party certification which has modified in depth the structure and roles of 
business networks (Hatanaka and al. 2005; Renart, 2005). From this trend several questions 
arise. First of all what kind of relationships and, more broadly, what kind of governance 
mechanisms are necessary to be developed, both within and outside business networks, in 
order to create legitimacy? How should we deal with the position of these new partners (the 
third party certifiers) in relation to the other business network partners such as customers, 
suppliers, competitors? What types of links are to be developed by business networks with the 
certification markets? Our central argument is that the building of legitimacy  of business 
networks  through  certification  needs  the  development  of  what  we  call  differentiated 
relationships, based on the central element: governance mechanism. Mainly theoretical, our 
communication  develops  the  argument  through  a  critical  review  of  literature.  We  will 
illustrate this question with the specific example of a specific third party certification market: 
a fair trade market. To analyze this question, it is necessary to understand the real content of 
the notion of legitimacy in general and in relation to organizational theory. 
So  we  use  previous  research  on  organizational  legitimacy  (Elsbach,  1994)  and 
institutional theories (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) to explain how business networks can 
adopt and manage legitimacy. We exploit also economic theory (Brousseau and Raynaud, 
2006) and social theory of agency (Westphal and Zajac, 1998) to explain the adoption of 
specific  governance  mechanisms  (Provan  and  Kenis,  2007)  that  legitimate  the  networks. 
Indeed,  the  mechanisms  of  governance  reveal  specific  properties  reflected  by  their 
embeddedness and their situation. Stemming from our conceptualization and proposals, we 
illustrate  the  building  of  legitimacy  of  business  networks  through  specific  governance 
mechanism with third party certifiers at the heart of the system. 
We organize the paper to different parts. In the first part we present the importance of 
legitimacy in business networks. In the second part we explain how to manage legitimacy in 
business  networks.  We  stress  the  importance  of  the  governance  mechanisms  within  and 
outside  business  networks.  In  the  third  part  we  analyze  the  concept  of  legitimacy  on  a 
certification  market  showing  the  relationships  between  the  third  party  certifiers  and  other 
partners (customers, suppliers). 
We conclude our work by showing the impact of governance mechanisms to build legitimacy 




THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGITIMACY IN BUSINESS NETWORKS 
 
First of all the notion of legitimacy is found mainly in social and political literature. Also 
sociological  and  marketing  literature  enable  to  understand  the  interest  of  the  legitimacy 
concept in inter organizational network and business markets. 
In a general context, the process of legitimacy appears when problems of credibility arise 
in organizations and markets. Organizations can have divergence about social norms but they 
retain legitimacy. Sometimes an organization cannot be sure about a legitimacy of another 
organization, consequently it is difficult to join this organization and exchange with it in a 
business network. For example, a certification is conditioned by the payment of cash, and 
there is no monitoring, no verification of technical or economical capabilities before obtaining 3 
this certification (Sine et al. 2007). That way the question of inter organizational relationship 
legitimacy in a network arises. So our interest is to assess the impact of legitimacy in inter 
organizational networks and in which the way these relationships have to be considered as 
differentiated.  What  is  legitimacy  and  how  can  business  networks  reach  legitimacy  to 
conform to institutional and/or market expectations? 
For Suchman (1995: 574), “legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. It is sometimes used to maintain social 
structures (Burger and Luckmann, 1966).  
“Legitimacy is socially constructed in that it reflects congruence between the behaviors of 
the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group; thus, 
legitimacy is dependent on a collective audience, yet independent of particular observers” 
(Suchman, 1995: 574). For this author an organization may move away from individual’s 
values  yet  retain  legitimacy  because  the  deviation  draws  no  public  disapproval.  Social 
entrepreneurs create frames based on legitimacy and by mobilizing their resources. These 
entrepreneurs focus on a pre-existing cultural menu” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and “construct 
new cognitive models and formal structures” via a method of “bricolage” (Douglas 1986). So 
legitimacy leads an organization to follow social norms (Schuman, 1995; Scott, 1995, 2001). 
These definitions express that legitimacy implies social aspects and that is linked to the 
relationships between individuals.  
On the other hand, researchers built classifications of the different kinds of legitimacy. By 
focusing on previous works, Suchman (1995) identified three types of legitimacy: pragmatic 
legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy.  
Pragmatic legitimacy is focused on self-interested calculations of persons who are directly 
in relation with an organization. Often, this immediacy involves direct exchanges between 
organization  and  its  audience  (persons).  However,  it  can  also  involve  broader  political, 
economic,  or  social  interdependencies,  in  which  organizational  action  nonetheless  visibly 
affects the audience’s well-being (Suchman (1995: 578). 
Using Aldrich and Fiol (1994), Suchman (1995: 579) presented moral legitimacy as a 
positive normative evaluation of the organization and its activities. By comparing pragmatic 
legitimacy to moral legitimacy, Suchman (1995) noted that moral legitimacy did not rely on 
judgments  about  whether  a  given  activity  benefits  the  evaluator,  but  rather  on  judgments 
about whether the activity is “the right thing to do”. Consequently these judgments, in turn, 
usually  reflect  beliefs  about  whether  the  activity  effectively  promotes  societal  welfare,  as 
defined  by  the  audience’s  socially  constructed  value  system.  The  judgments  are  different 
according to the type of moral legitimacy. Suchman (1995: 579-581) distinguished four types 
of moral legitimacy: consequential legitimacy, procedural legitimacy, structural legitimacy 
and personal legitimacy. In consequential legitimacy, organizations should be judged by what 
they accomplish, consumer judgments of quality. Procedural legitimacy allows organizations 
to acquire moral legitimacy by embracing socially accepted techniques and procedures. In a 
context of structural legitimacy, audiences see the organization as valuable and worthy of 
support because its structural characteristics locate it within a morally  favored taxonomic 
category. Personal legitimacy relies on the charisma of individual organizational leaders.  
The last type of legitimacy in Suchman’s classification is a cognitive legitimacy which 
may  involve  either  affirmative  backing  for  an  organization  or  mere  acceptance  of  the 
organization  as  necessary  or  inevitable  based  on  some  taken-for-granted  cultural  account 
(Suchman, 1995: 582).  
In sum up, Suchman (1995) cleared about two forms of legitimacy:  strategic legitimating 
actions and institutional processes. Strategic legitimating actions consist for organizations to 
manipulate and to deploy evocative symbols in order to garner societal support. Strategic 4 
legitimating actions include ceremonially adopting legitimated formal structures or obtaining 
endorsements  from  central  institutional  actors.  Institutional  processes  that  rise  above  the 
actions  of  any  single  organization  and  affect  entire  sectors,  or  forms  of  organizations. 
Institutional process concerns also sector level processes that include increasing density (i.e. 
accessibility) and integration into existing legal instructions that make organizational forms 
seem more natural and taken for arranged. 
 
Berger  and  Luckmann  (1966:  93)  introduced  a  ‘cognitive’  and  a  ‘normative’  form  of 
legitimacy. According to these authors, if the institutions are to survive, they need ways of 
convincing new adherents that the meaning embodied by the institution is relevant to these 
newcomers. Seeing the relevance of an institution convinces newcomers to internalize what 
others  had  previously  externalized.  They  explain  that  this  is  true  even  if  individuals  are 
exposed  to  complex  institutional  orders  (overlapping  or  contradictory  institutions  or 
institutional elements). Indeed, individuals ‘know’ their world is a consistent whole; their 
‘knowledge’ is used to invent a comprehensive logic to justify their place in these institutional 
orders. Thus establishing a cycle where individuals are led to define the world of meaning 
(the reality) within which they perceive themselves to exist. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue that with respect to both institutions and symbolic 
universes,  maintenance  of  these  social  structures  falls  to  the  process  of  legitimization. 
Consequently the process of legitimization begins when a ‘problem’ first arises.  
 
We notice that legitimacy can improve relationships in a network but in some ways it can 
be a source of problems (conflicts). Legitimacy is linked to behaviors of the organizations 
members and it affects how the members understand this organization. So, legitimacy must 
include evaluative and cognitive dimensions to establish good relationships. In the next part, 




RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS NETWORKS: HOW TO ADOPT AND TO 
MANAGE LEGITIMACY? 
 
In this part, we deal with the development of governance mechanisms within and outside 
business networks in order to create and manage legitimacy.  
According  to  Elsbach  (1994),  legitimacy  can  represent  a  way  to  avoid  or  reduce 
competition  effects,  and  governance  mechanisms  help  organizations  to  apply  legitimacy 
principles. This author proposes to integrate individuals’ use of different forms of accounts 
(impression  about  the  management)  to  the  organization’s  maintenance  to  endorse  these 
characteristics. Elsbach (1994) demonstrated the capacity of governance mechanisms for the 
organizations to communicate their efforts about legitimacy the conception of which is absent 
in institutional theorists contribution. What kinds of governance mechanisms are necessary to 
create and manage legitimacy?  
The adoption of  governance mechanisms to legitimate business networks is related to 
some factors: resources mobilized in the relationships and habituation of the individuals. 
In a sociopolitical conception, legitimacy is linked to resources and potential founders that 
affected  decision.  Facing  the  challenge,  organizations  mobilize  different  sets  of  resources 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977) and their size determines what kinds of resources they can acquire 
(Carroll, 1985, Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In this context, legitimacy is represented through 
agreement with norms and regulations (Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, and Torres, 1995: 523). 5 
Legitimacy  in  networks  is  based  on  agreements,  norms  and  rules  (Hannan  and  al,  1995; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 1977) between the partners in the relationships.  
Regarding habituation, Berger and Luckmann (1966: 93) stressed that when two or more 
people interact, habituation of their actions is inevitable. They noticed that the standardization 
of habituation implies a common comprehension of the goals, phases, and forms of action are 
necessary. They suggested the performance of specific roles that consist in the specialization 
of knowledge for roles and that implies a social distribution of knowledge, and the distinction 
between specialized knowledge and general knowledge. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) showed that habituation helps to predict the future, embeds 
meaning  in  actions,  simplifies  the  decision‐making  responsibilities  in  life,  and  releases 
resources for other ends. Thus, the standardization of certain habituated actions or institutions 
symbolizes the need for people to control or predict the actions of others, even if no overt 
sanction regime exists. 
DiMaggio  and  Powell  (1983:  150),  proposed  three  mechanisms  to  standardize 
habituations  externalized  by  previous  participants  in  the  organization  (or  the  originators): 
coercive processes, mimetic processes and normative processes. 
Coercive processes involve the exertion of formal or informal direct authority by one actor on 
another. Mimetic processes are driven by the changing organization, often in circumstances of 
uncertainty,  ritualistic  behavior,  or  cost  savings.  Finally,  the  educational  and  networking 
aspects of professionalization primarily drive the authors’ third isomorphic mechanism, the 
normative process. By identifying three types of governance mechanisms to legitimate an 
organization, DiMaggio and Powell (1983), express the distinction between causes and effects 
relevant to the organizational research context. 
On the other hand, Sine and al. (2007: 580-581) analyzed the role of the legal system to 
legitimate an organization. Indeed, legitimacy is viewed as related to the legal system because 
it can facilitate the diffusion of formalized personnel procedures (Weber, 1947; Tolbert and 
Zucker, 1983). So legitimacy can impact organizational structures and policies.  
Economic theory (Brousseau and Raynaud, 2006) and social theory of agency (Westphal 
and  Zajac,  1998)  serve  also  to  explain  the  adoption  of  specific  governance  mechanisms 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007) that legitimate the networks.  
Provan  and  Kenis  (2007);  following  Suchman,  explain  that  legitimacy  is  critical  for 
maintaining  the  status  and  viability  of  networks.  They  raise  an  important  question:  the 
distinction  between  the  legitimacy  of  networks  and  the  legitimacy  in  networks.  Let  us 
distinguish the two levels. For these authors, “a key concern for any governance mechanisms 
is  to  develop  internal  legitimacy  among  participants  (…).  If  participants  do  not  see 
interactions and coordinated efforts as being a legitimate way of conducting business, with 
potential benefit from these interactions (either social or economic), then the network is likely 
to exist in name only with little real commitment by participants to network-level goals and 
outcomes.” (Provan and Kenis, 2007:15). In other words, internal legitimacy refers to the way 
individuals internalize common values and norms related to a specific network. 
But a network has also to meet another category of expectations: the ones of external 
partners  such  as  customers,  stakeholders,  governments  and  so  on.  In  being  responsive  to 
external expectations, which could be very heterogeneous, network governance builds up its 
external legitimacy. Provan and Kenis identify one major problem for legitimacy in relation to 
governance issues: the potential tension between internal and external legitimacy. In many 
cases,  the  needs  of  individuals  “are  not  always  compatible  with  the  broader  external 
legitimacy needs of the network as a whole”. At the end, the authors emphasize that “the 
tension is in part between individualistic versus collectivistic legitimacy concerns, and in part 
between a focus on building internal network interactions versus building the credibility of the 
network to outsiders”. (Provan and Kenis, 2007:16). 6 
 
Even  if  governance  mechanisms  facilitate  the  implementation  of  legitimacy  in  the 
organizations, they can imply negative consequences that must be considered. Indeed rules 
can cause other tensions to persist and the tension reproduces another rule (Gouldner, 1954). 
Also,  the  different  legitimacy  management  strategies  become  codified  and  repetitive,  so 
individuals will become more pessimistic in their interpretations of firm activities. To remain 





LEGITIMACY ON A CERTIFICATION MARKET: DEVELOPMENT OF 
DIFFERENCIATED RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS NETWORKS 
 
In the third part we explain the importance of the certification process to gain legitimacy 
on a certification market and we show characteristics of the relationships between the third 
party  certifiers  and  others  partners  (producers,  suppliers,  non-governmental  organizations, 
customers). Then we present the case of certification on a fair trade market. 
Using Schuman (1995) classification on legitimacy, Sine, David and Mitsuhashi (2007: 
578)  analyze  strategic  legitimating  action  that  corresponds  to  the  obtainment  of  external 
certification. Unlike the previous researches on certification that focuses on the information it 
provides about individual or organizational quality (Spence, 1974), certification is represented 
by Sine and al. (2007) in a context of regulation. Certification is defined certification as “a 
process in which a central institutional actor with authority or status formally acknowledges 
that a venture meets a particular standard” (Sine and al. 2007: 578).  
Sine and al. (2007) concentrated on legitimating impact of certification. They showed 
that value of a certification not based only on the ability to procure information (information 
that is unavailable elsewhere) but on its quality respecting some rules. So certification must 
confer legitimacy benefits. 
Indeed, legitimacy of business networks in a certification context is based on governance 
mechanisms such as agreements, norms and rules (Hannan and al, 1995); on a standardization 
of habituation and specification of roles (Berger and Luckmann, 1966); by the application of 
formal  and  informal  pressure  of  some  organizations  to  respect  working  conditions, 
productions  of  producers  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,  1983).  This  system  enables  to  control 
relationships between all of the partners in a network. Thus organization (specially nascent or 
new  entrepreneur)  has  a  greater  chance  of  success  in  the  business  if  it  obtains  a  formal 
certification from an authorized institutional actor (Sine and al. 2007: 587). 
But the positive impact of the firm certification on its legitimacy depends on contingent 
factors  (for  example  sector  legitimacy).  Indeed  “the  effects  of  certifications  at  the 
organizational level are contingent on these larger and sector-level processes: Certifications 
have a greater impact in the face of events that decrease the overall legitimacy of a sector and 
a smaller effect when a sector is characterized by greater legitimacy” (Sine and al. 2007: 590). 
So these authors concluded that regarding the negative press certification is more helpful for 
nascent entrepreneurs and less helpful in positive press situation.  
Other researches put the accent on third-party certifiers and the relationships between partners 
in  a  network  (Hanataka  and  al.  2005)  to  obtain  legitimacy.  These  authors  focused  their 
analysis on the role and implications for three key stakeholder groups. They showed that some 
partners  such  as  supermarket  chains,  producers,  consumers  and  non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are implied in a certification process to build their legitimacy in the 
network.  In  consequence  government  policy  and  international  development  assistance 7 
programs have an important role to play in enhancing the capacity of small holders to succeed 
in meeting the challenges of third party certification (Hanataka and al. 2005: 366). 
Third-party certifiers (TPCs) represent private or public organizations that are responsible 
for accessing, evaluating, and certifying safety and quality claims based on a particular set of 
standards and compliance methods. TPCs reorganize, transform and discipline people and 
things throughout the supply chain, with differential social and economic implications for 
various participants.  TPCs verify supplier compliance of systems, processes, and products for 
both private and public standards that concern food safety (Hanataka and al. 2005: 355). So, 
TPCs are at the heart of the certification process and they exchanges with suppliers, retailers 
and NGOs. 
In the relationship, suppliers must follow a set of principles to obtain certification: 1) To 
apply  to  a  particular  TPCs  for  certification.  2)  The  TPCs  conduct  a  pre-assessment  and 
documentation  review  of  a  supplier’s  facilities  and  production  operations.  3)    The  TPCs 
conduct field audits. 4) The TPCs issue a certification and allow the supplier to label its 
products  as  certified  when  conformity  is  verified.  However,  suppliers  are  responsible 
generally for meeting the costs of the audit (Hanataka and al. 2005: 357). The adoption of 
third party certification by suppliers is a way to gain and access to new markets (particularly 
for suppliers in developing countries). But the implementation of third party certification is 
sometimes  difficult  for  small  and  medium  suppliers  in  these  countries  because  there  are 
limitations to access information and to adapt to the obligation about standards established by 
retailers  in  develops  countries.  On  the  other  hand,  TPCs  oblige  farmers  to  implement  a 
traceability system that help ensure that any food safety or quality problem can be traced back 
to its origin. Furthermore, TPCs assist farmers to improve product standards when there are 
not public agrifood standards (Hanataka and al. 2005: 360-363). 
In  the  relation  with  retailers,  third-party  certifiers  are  in  charge  of  the  monitoring  of 
standards. Thus retailers’ responsibility for policing the safety and quality of their products is 
minimized and the TPCs enable retailers to shift the costs of monitoring food safety and 
quality to suppliers. Also retailers can use third party certification as a marketing tool to 
communicate  to  consumers  their  standards  by  the  use  of  labels  and  certification.  So  by 
guarantee a quality and safety of the products, the TPCs can lead to a reduced risk of product 
failure (Hanataka and al. 2005: 360). 
NGOs and consumer (activists) encourage all of the partners in the relationship to adopt 
third party certification to promote worker rights and environmental protection. Indeed, NGOs 
help to promote alternative production and consumption systems that are more socially just 
and  environmentally  sustainable  (certification  systems  for  their  social  and  environmental 
practices). Activists have as their objective to improve labor conditions and/or to institute 
more environmentally sound agricultural practices (Hanataka and al. 2005: 364-365). 
To  summarize,  Hanataka  and  al.  (2005)  presented  the  certification  as  a  means  and  a 
process  for  partners  in  the  network  to  guarantee  and  to  create  trust  in  their  product  by 
providing  information  about  the  commodity  and  its  production  processes.  This  process  is 
conducted by the TPCs that defines objectives and gives directives to respect economic, social 
and environmental rules on a market. Also the pressure of NGOs and consumers facilitates the 
respect of social and environmental norms. In this context, TPCs allow producers and retailers 
to demonstrate to their customers that the products respect the minimum standards. 
We find this formalization in the process of the certification on a fair trade market.  
 
Fair  trade  is  a  regulated  market  which  aims  to  reduce  disparities  between  North  and 
South: “Fair trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect that 
seek greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by offering 
better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers 8 
especially in the South. Fair trade organizations, backed by consumers, are engaged actively 
in supporting producers, awareness raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and 
practice  of  conventional  international  trade”  (FINE
1,  2001).  So,  fair  trade  represents:  “an 
alternative approach to conventional trade that aims to improve the livelihoods and well-being 
of  small  producers  by  improving  their  market  access,  strengthening  their  organizations, 
paying them a fair price, and providing continuity in trading relationships” (Giovannucci and 
Koekoek, 2003: 38). In this context, organizations aim to allow the production of fair trade 
products in developing countries and to sell this product in developed countries. This consists 
in balancing the business of fair trade products between actors in the North and in the South, 
to  resolve  difficulties  related  to  the  production  and  the  marketing  of  the  products  and  to 
protect the environment. 
Fair trade was created by activists, nongovernmental organizations, and coffee-farmer 
cooperatives with the aim of providing cooperatives with better prices. These organizations 
were ‘self-regulated’ because they established their own norms and criteria and they were 
‘self-certified’ because they had control over the processes of inspection (Carimentrand and 
Ballet, 2004 in Renard 2005: 422). Now the concept is extended on other sectors such as 
fruits (bananas) and clothing.  
Fair  trade  is  based  on  standardization  of  conditions  of  production,  distribution  and 
commercialization  of  products  respecting  certification  norms  (economic,  social,  and 
environmental norms). Indeed fair trade label is considered as a brand that guarantees social 
conditions:  the  direct  purchase  by  consumers,  a  minimum  price,  and  the  long  time 
relationships between producers and buyers and the respect for human rights (minimum social 
security,  refusal  of  child  labor,  etc.).  Environmental  criteria  are  added  to  social  criteria: 
decrease in the use of pesticides and artificial fertilizers, waste recycling, prevention of the 
water pollution. The brand represents one of the main resources in this market. For example in 
the sector of the fair trade bananas “Fairtrade
2” represents a brand which conveys a fair trade 
concept  and  its  image  is  recognized  by  consumers  and  distributors  in  the  world:  “Some 
distributors accept only to sell their products when they are labeled Max Havelaar. It is  the 
same  reaction  for  some  partners  who  say  that  if  bananas  or  fruits  are  not  labeled  Max 
Havelaar we cannot sell them as Fairtrade » (Interview with a representative of AgroFair, 
bananas company in France, June 2007). So to deliver a product to the client, owners of the 
brand  (banana  brand  and  fair  trade  brand)  exchange  with  external  partners  to  realize  the 
transaction. In the following part, we will develop this relationship in a fair trade market. 
Producers are organized in order to be able to comply with the quality criteria public 
agencies that provide legal coverage for quality definitions and guarantee their veracity to 
consumers. And in some countries food product certification is shaped by public policy, for 
example  in  France  the  French  standardization  agency  (AFNOR)  was  charged  with 
standardization prior to certification. Thus under AFNOR norms, certification requires third-
party intervention. (Renard 2005: 422). In a fair trade market, it is a certification organization 
FLO  (Fairtrade  labeling  organization)  that  work  with  the  fair  trade  association  (Max 
Havelaar) producers, distributors and consumers to elaborate the standards. 
For the consumers, fair trade is a guarantee that the product respects the condition of the 
fair trade market: the respect of the producers in developing countries, to share equitably the 
                                                           
1 FINE is an informal association of the four main Fair trade networks: F (Fair trade Labelling Organizations: 
FLO), I (International Fair Trade Association represented now by World Fair Trade Organization: WFTO), N 
(Network of European Worldshops: NEWS) and E (European Fair Trade Association). It was created in 1998. 
2 Since 2008, a fair trade association Max Havelaar and its partners decide to use “Fairtrade” as a label and to 
represent the association (in the world). 9 
price between producers and sellers in develop countries, the respect social of environmental 
norms.  
Organizations in the fair trade market share common objectives:  “sometimes we have a 
common interest in the marketing, we can create promotion together, sometimes AgroFair is 
supplying  retailers.  It  was  important  that  we  had  a  direct  connection  with  the  retailers” 
(Interview with a representative of Agrofair, bananas Company in Netherlands, 2008). “The 
interest is not only to buy and to resell, the interest is to have a common project, to accept the 
requirements  that  the  customers  can  have”  (Interview  with  a  representative  of  Az 
Méditerranée,  ripeners  company  in  France,  2008).  To  achieve  the  mission,  standards  and 
norms are instituted by partners in the relationship. Certifications rules, contracts, licenses, 
norms  and  cooperation  allow  apply  these  standards.  To  apply  the  rules,  contractual 
relationships between all of the members are established to consider all the preoccupations of 
the  partners  (FLO,  producers,  consumers,  distributors)  These  contracts  integrate  their 
objectives  in  a  network:  a  better  price  for  the  producer,  a  negotiation  agreement  with 
distributors, the respect of the quality of the product and engage in solidarity and ethical 
action. 
Nevertheless, the fair trade concept is confronted with the development of a lot of brands. 
To avoid competition among diverse fair trade labels and resulting consumer confusion, FLO 
decided to institutionalize the fair trade label. FLO developed a uniform international label 
named “Fairtrade Certification Mark” (CM). It is a means for FLO to protect the fair trade 
label  again  competitive  alternatives  and  to  obtain  official  recognition.  Consequently  this 
certification organization can be qualified as an independent certification organization under 




CONCLUSION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The  firm  feels  pressure  to  conform  to  institutional  expectations,  and  reacts  by  doing 
something to earn institutional legitimacy. Certification systems can help them to build trust 
between actors in the commodity chain by providing independent assurance that the end-
product meets the appropriate process and product standards (Hatanaka and al. 2005: 365). 
Also  government  policy  and  international  development  assistance  programs  have  an 
important role to play in enhancing the capacity of small holders to succeed in meeting the 
challenges.  The  development  of  third  party  certification  can  be  a  means  to  change  and 
improve relationships in the business networks. 
To have a positive impact of certification on organizational legitimacy, all of the partners 
in business networks must organize and center the relationships with third party certifiers. 
These actions consist in establishing and respecting standard rules and norms, to define the 
rules  and  obligations  of  each  partner  in  the  relationship  (by  certifiers).  In  respecting 
conditions  of  certification,  partners  (producers,  retailers,  and  distributors)  can  create  trust 
from consumers and legitimate their actions in the market. They can reduce their costs on a 
market. It is also necessary for a nascent entrepreneur to obtain a formal certification to have a 
greater chance of reaching operational start-up (Sine and al. 2007). 
 
The fair trade is one of the markets where certification plays an importance to build 
legitimacy. Indeed in this market the significance of environmental issues increase through 
the  success  of  some  concepts  ``green  partnerships,  green  technologies,  green  products  or 
processes``.   10 
However the positive impact of certification in legitimacy depends on the size of the 
organization and the demand (such as the necessity of the certification in the sector), (Sine 
and al. 2007).  
The coordination between all of the partners in the relationships is important to ensure to 
success. To reinforce and adapt to environmental conditions and consumer demand (using of 
new marketing strategy, new standards), all the partners on the fair trade market take some 
actions to reduce limits, to pursue their mission and create greater value. These actions can be 
completed by the negotiation of programs based on training, control and political decisions. 
That consists in changing the policies of the company: by reinforcing policies for training, to 
lay  the  foundations  a  code  of  conduct  for  transactions,  to  control  employees  by  human 
resources, executives. To support current standards and contracts, partners must review some 
rules and norms; reduce constraints to apply norms, and adapt regulations and standards to 
diverse products. Finally, they have to verify if the price of the fair trade product is adapted to 
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